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ELEMENTARY UNFAIRNESS: FEDERAL
RECIDIVISM STATUTES AND THE GAP IN
INDIGENT AMERICAN INDIAN
DEFENDANTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COUNSEL
BY THAIS-LYN TRAYER*
Indigent American Indian defendants suffer from a gap in federal laws that
denies them full Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel protections. Indian
defendants are not automatically guaranteed representation by a lawyer in
tribal court. Constitutional difficulties arise when these uncounseled
convictions are later used to support prosecution of repeat offender crimes in
federal court. Supporters of this practice, most recently upheld in United
States v. Cavanaugh, point to the status of tribal nations as inherently
sovereign and beyond the reach of the Bill of Rights. This Comment argues
that federal courts should nevertheless approach prosecution of recidivist crimes
by Indian defendants as if the Sixth Amendment applies. Different treatment
of Indian defendants in federal court is based on a misunderstanding of
criminal law, whereby defendants are given fewer procedural protections when
prior convictions are considered sentencing factors, rather than elements of
crimes. To avoid these semantics, courts should return to the Supreme Court’s
original intent underlying the right to counsel: ensuring a conviction’s
reliability. This approach is more appropriate for considering judgments from
sovereign Indian nations. Furthermore, it resolves inadequacies of the 2010
Tribal Law and Order Act’s partial Sixth Amendment grant. By returning to
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a reliability analysis, federal courts can ensure indigent American Indians are
not the only U.S. citizens subject to federal criminal prosecutions supported by
uncounseled convictions simply because they are too poor to afford counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
While driving with their three children in 2008, Roman Cavanaugh
Jr. and his wife began a dispute that soon became physical.1
Cavanaugh grabbed his wife’s hair and pushed her face into the

1. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
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dashboard.2 He attempted to choke her, stopped the car, pulled
her from the vehicle, and repeatedly kicked her.3 Cavanaugh then
drove away.4
Four years later, a federal district court sentenced Cavanaugh to
five years and six months in prison.5 This conviction and sentencing
was one of the first pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 117,6 a new federal
offense created in the Violence Against Women and Department of
Justice Reauthorization Act of 20057 (“VAWA III”). The crime,
labeled “[d]omestic assault by an habitual offender,” punishes
individuals who commit domestic assault and who have at least two
prior, similar convictions.8 Cavanaugh had a history of three
misdemeanor domestic abuse offenses,9 including punching his
eleven and twelve-year-old sons.10 VAWA III thus achieved a victory.
It punished a repeat offender with an increased sentence for
continuing to commit acts of violence. Yet to reach this goal, the
federal court overlooked a lack of procedural protections in
Cavanaugh’s prior convictions: Cavanaugh lacked counsel during his
previous trials.11 The court could do so because Cavanaugh is an
enrolled member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe.12
Indigent American Indian13 defendants suffer from a gap in federal
laws that denies them full Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
2. Id.
3. Id.; Fort Totten Man Sentenced for Domestic Assault by a Habitual Offender, U.S. ATT’Y’S
OFFICE, DISTRICT OF N.D. (Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Fort Totten Man Sentenced], http:
//www.justice.gov/usao/nd/news/2012/09-17-12-Cavanaugh,%20Jr%20Sentenced.html.
4. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
5. Id. at 595; Fort Totten Man Sentenced, supra note 3.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). One of the first convictions under this statute
occurred in June 2012, three month before Cavanaugh’s sentencing. See Standing
Rock Tribal Council Member Convicted by Federal Jury of Domestic Assault by Habitual
Offender, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, DIST. OF N.D. (June 6, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao
/sd/pressreleases/2012/Pierre-2012-06-06-St.%20John.html (reporting a guilty
verdict delivered in June 2012 as among the first convictions obtained under the
statute, three months prior to Cavanaugh’s sentencing).
7. Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 909, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084 (2006).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
9. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
10. Dave Kolpack, ND Man Sentenced in Pivotal Domestic Violence Case, NECN.COM,
(Sept. 17, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.necn.com/09/17/12/ND-man-sentenced-inpivotal-domestic-vio/landing_nation.html?&apID=5ef87deb74284ebe88df614e2114f4d9.
11. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
12. See id. at 594, 596 (explaining that Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(6),(b),(c)(2), does not require tribal courts to appoint counsel to indigent
defendants for crimes with sentences of less than one year).
13. The term “Indian” has developed as a political classification, as opposed to a
racial classification. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974)
(recognizing that Congress applies the term “Indian” to members of federallyrecognized tribes, which does not include all individuals racially classified as
Indians); see also STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 60 (4th ed.
2012) (explaining that the Morton case finds constitutional support for treating
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protections in certain federal criminal proceedings. Under the Sixth
Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”14
However, the Supreme Court has long held that the Constitution
protects the rights of Indians as U.S. citizens vis-à-vis the federal
government, not as enrolled members vis-à-vis tribal nations.15 In
other words, due to the limited reach of Bill of Rights protections,
indigent Indian defendants are not entitled to court-appointed
counsel in tribal courts.16 This situation is unique because the Sixth
Amendment dictates that all indigent defendants—both Indian
and non-Indian—enjoy this right in federal and state courts.17 As a
result, constitutional difficulties arise when prior convictions from
tribal courts, obtained without assistance of counsel, are used in
federal court either to enhance sentencing or to prove an element
of an offense.
This Comment argues that uncounseled tribal court convictions
should not be used as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes in
federal criminal proceedings. Part I describes this special problem,
which lies at the intersection of criminal law and federal Indian law.
It traces the history of the right to counsel in prosecution of recidivist
crimes, as well as the ways in which Congress and the Supreme Court
determine Indian rights and criminal jurisdiction over Indian crimes.
Part I concludes by examining United States v. Cavanaugh,18 which
exemplifies the predominant rationales for permitting uncounseled
tribal court convictions to enhance federal sentencing.
Part II argues that federal courts are wrong to permit this practice,
which is only sustained by misapplying Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Part explains how the Cavanaugh court
mistakenly shifted away from the Supreme Court’s intent in
establishing a right to counsel for indigent defendants: ensuring the
American Indians different from other groups of people based on their
political status).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (describing the Cherokee
Nation’s sovereignty as predating that of the Constitution and therefore not
confined by the Fifth Amendment). Members of Indian tribes are referred to as “enrolled”
members. See Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/tribes
/enrollment.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (describing enrollment criteria as varying
from tribe to tribe but frequently including “lineal descendency” and relationships to
a tribal members).
16. See discussion infra Part I.B.b (explaining that the Bill of Rights was
incorporated against the states but never applied to tribal nations).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applying the right to counsel to “all criminal
prosecutions”).
18. 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
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reliability of convictions. Part II asserts that a return to this reliability
analysis is more appropriate for considering judgments from
inherently sovereign Indian nations. Finally, this Comment contends
that the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which provides a partial
right to counsel in some prosecutions, is inadequate to solve this
unique constitutional problem.
It concludes by arguing that
American Indians should not be the only class of U.S. citizens who
can be prosecuted in federal court based on a prior uncounseled
conviction, simply on the basis of being too poor to afford a lawyer.19
I.

BACKGROUND

One out of every three American Indian women is raped in her
lifetime.20 Furthermore, Indian women experience battery at a rate
of 23.2 per 1,000, as compared with 8 per 1,000 among Caucasian
women.21 To address these disproportionately high rates of violence,
VAWA III created a new federal crime, 18 U.S.C. § 117: “Domestic
assault by an habitual offender.”22
The statute authorizes
imprisonment for up to five years for anyone who commits domestic
assault in Indian country23 and has at least two prior convictions for
“assault, sexual abuse, or serious violent felony against a spouse or
intimate partner.”24 The prior convictions may be from state, federal,

19. Tribal courts are one of the only judicial forums in the United States where a
constitutional right to counsel may not exist. See infra Part II.C (explaining that
although this constitutional right may not apply, some tribes voluntarily provide
public defender services). Juveniles undergo criminal proceedings different from
adults and are subject to different procedural protections. See, e.g., McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (denying the right to a jury trial in juvenile
adjudications). They nevertheless enjoy the right to counsel in those proceedings.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). United States citizen-detainees in trials by military
tribunals also enjoy this right. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the citizen-detainee “unquestionably has the right
to access to counsel”); see also In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to
Counsel, 892 F. Supp. 2d 8, 28 (D.D.C. 2012) (confirming access to counsel for nonU.S. detainees held at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay). The right to counsel
is disputed as a statutory right in immigration proceedings, but these defendants are
not U.S. citizens. See Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1090–91 (9th Cir.
2012) (detailing the circuit split on whether prejudice should be an element of a
right to counsel claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
20. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN
FROM SEXUAL V IOLENCE IN THE USA 2 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa
.org/women/maze/report.pdf.
21. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 901(3), 119 Stat. 2960, 3077 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. 3796gg-10 note (2012)) (reciting the Congressional findings).
22. Id. §§ 902, 909. 119 Stat. at 3078, 3084, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2012)).
23. “Indian country” is a legal term that refers to Indian communities and
reservation lands. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).
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or tribal court.25 The penalty increases to a maximum of ten years if
the assault results in substantial bodily injury.26
Until codification of 18 U.S.C. § 117, tribal communities lacked a
way to hold repeat offenders accountable for multiple offenses.27
However, authority to prosecute this new domestic violence crime
actually resides with federal law enforcement. The Department of
Justice recognizes a “federal trust responsibility” that extends to the
safety of Indian women and children.28 This relationship between the
federal government and tribal nations, predicated on the sovereignty
of the latter, has endured a complicated history with overlapping
roles for tribal, state, and federal authorities in law enforcement.29
Even though tribal governments govern many aspects of their own
affairs, their sovereignty is subject to restrictions by Congress.30 As a
result, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country has been described as a
“maze.”31 American Indians have become increasingly subject to
federal criminal jurisdiction over the years32 while enjoying fewer
constitutional protections than other Americans in certain criminal
proceedings.33 In particular, they suffer from a major constitutional
25. Id. § 117(a).
26. Id.
27. See Nat’l Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women,
Safety for Indian Women, § 909 Domestic Assault by an Habitual Offender, RESTORATION OF
NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY & SAFETY FOR NATIVE WOMEN, Oct. 2010, at 26, 26 (praising the
statute for sending a “global” message to offender populations that the federal
government is invested in victim safety).
28. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 901(6), 119 Stat. 2960, 3078 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
3796gg-10 note (2012)). “Federal trust responsibility” refers to the unique
relationship between the U.S. government and Indian tribes, which is based on “the
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the [federal] Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.” Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 U.S 286, 296 (1942).
29. See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34–61
(4th ed. 2004) (providing a historical background on the special relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes).
30. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (explaining that
Congress’s law enforcement authority over Indian land arises from its constitutional
treaty power and commerce power, a judicially-created Indian trusteeship theory,
and federal statues).
31. Id. at 504–05 (remarking on the “chaotic allocation” of law enforcement
authority between federal, state, and tribal courts).
32. See infra Part I.B.1.a (describing how successive federal laws have divested
tribal nations of criminal jurisdiction over certain offenses committed in Indian
country). Federal prosecution of crimes in Indian country has increased by 54%
from 2009 to 2012. David Stout, More U.S. Prosecution of Crimes in Indian Country Is
Seen as Heartening, MAIN JUST. (May 30, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com
/2013/05/30/more-u-s-prosecution-of-crimes-in-indian-country-is-seen-as-heartening/.
33. See infra Part I.B.1.b (setting forth federal circuit court views that American
Indian defendants’ prior, uncounseled convictions from tribal courts may be used to
support enhanced penalties under repeat offender laws in federal court).
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difficulty that arises under recidivist statutes: the challenge of how to
punish a repeat offender for committing yet another crime when his
criminal history consists of prior convictions where he was
unrepresented by counsel.
A. Constitutional Challenges to the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and
Recidivist Crimes
1.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an attorney in
Over time, the Supreme Court’s
criminal prosecutions.34
interpretation of the Amendment has expanded its meaning to
include the right to be represented by a lawyer in state and federal
court proceedings for prosecution of felonies and misdemeanors,
regardless of the ability to afford legal representation.
The right to counsel was first challenged in Powell v. Alabama35 in
1932, where defendants facing the death penalty were not appointed
a lawyer until the morning of their trial.36 The Alabama Supreme
Court found that this delay did not violate a state statute
guaranteeing the right to counsel in capital cases.37 The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision in favor of the
defendants, citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.38 While not yet implicating the Sixth Amendment,
Powell laid the foundation for how the right to counsel is understood
today. The Court reasoned that denial of the right to be heard
through counsel equated to a denial of a fair hearing and was,
therefore, a fundamental violation of due process of law.39 According
to the Court, even an intelligent layperson lacks the “skill and
knowledge” to prepare her defense,40 and for this reason “requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings.” 41
The Court determined that the right to be heard through counsel,

34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40
(1963) (construing the Sixth Amendment to guarantee federal defendants the right
to counsel unless it is intelligibly waived).
35. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 59–60.
38. See id. at 67–68, 73 (concluding that the right to counsel cannot be denied
without violating fundamental principles of liberty and justice).
39. Id. at 68–69 (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”).
40. Id. at 69.
41. Id.
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and thus the appointment of counsel, is an “immutable principle[]
of justice.”42
Six years later, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst43 drew from its
reasoning in Powell to recognize the right to counsel in federal
criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment.44 The Court
once more emphasized inequities between lawyers and laypersons in
criminal proceedings.45 Rather than relying on due process concerns
in prosecution of a federal crime, the Court stated that the Sixth
Amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself.”46 In this way, Johnson built on Powell to establish
the right to counsel as a constitutional mandate under the Sixth
Amendment and, absent waiver by the defendant, a jurisdictional
prerequisite to any deprivation of life and liberty.47
In 1942, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that Johnson
extended the right to counsel to state court proceedings in Betts v.
Brady.48 Concerns of incorporating the Bill of Rights against the
states continued until the 1963 landmark decision, Gideon v.
Wainwright.49 Twenty years after Betts, the Court rejected its earlier
reasoning and returned to the principle of the right to counsel as
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial.”50 The Court considered it
an obvious truth that any person “too poor to hire a lawyer[] cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”51 It noted
the need for a lawyer was best stated in Powell:
If charged with crime, [a defendant] is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
42. Id. at 71. Nevertheless, Powell’s holding was limited to defendants in capital
cases who suffered from “ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like.” Id.
43. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
44. Id. at 463 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69).
45. See id. at 462–63 (recognizing “[t]hat which is simple, orderly and
necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex,
and mysterious”).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 467–68.
48. See 316 U.S. 455, 464–66, 471 (1942) (concluding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not obligate states to furnish counsel in all cases, and that the
provision of counsel is a state’s legislative policy choice), overruled by Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States
Supreme Court’s Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and the Public Service Role of
Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1993) [hereinafter Gideon
Conference] (remarks of Abe Krash) (discussing federalism as a primary concern of
the Supreme Court’s consideration of whether to obligate states to appoint counsel).
50. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465).
51. Id. at 344.
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counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have
a perfect one.52

With this quotation from Powell, the Court declared Betts “an
anachronism”53 and extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to indigent defendants in state court proceedings pursuant to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
Although under Gideon only defendants facing felony charges were
guaranteed representation,55 the Court subsequently extended this
protection to prosecution of misdemeanors in Argersinger v. Hamlin.56
It reasoned that regardless of the severity of the offense, assistance of
counsel “has relevance to any criminal trial, where an accused is
deprived of his liberty.”57 After Argersinger, the Sixth Amendment is
applicable to both felony and misdemeanor proceedings in federal
and state courts.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is still subject
to limitation. For instance, in Scott v. Illinois,58 the Supreme Court
declined to extend the Sixth Amendment to prosecution of
misdemeanors that do not result in imprisonment.59 The Court
explained that imprisonment is a different and more serious kind of
penalty than others, such as monetary fines.60 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments only obligate
the appointment of counsel when an indigent defendant is sentenced
to a term of imprisonment.61 In so holding, the Court ignored the
dissent’s concerns about “problems of administration”; whether a
defendant’s criminal proceeding results in imprisonment is only
apparent after the conviction has occurred.62 Despite this concern,
52. Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The holding of Gideon is limited to appointment of counsel in felony cases
because Gideon was charged with a felony. Id. at 336–37; see also Loper v. Beto, 405
U.S. 473, 481 (1972) (“In [Gideon] the Court unanimously announced a clear and
simple constitutional rule: In the absence of waiver, a felony conviction is invalid if it
was obtained in a court that denied the defendant the help of a lawyer.”); Yale
Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright a Quarter-Century Later, 10 PACE L. REV. 343, 347
(1990) (explaining that states supported a narrow ruling in favor of limiting Gideon
to felony cases).
56. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
57. Id. at 32.
58. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
59. Id. at 373–74.
60. Id. at 373.
61. Id. at 373–74.
62. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Scott remains the standard for when assistance of counsel is required
in misdemeanor cases.
2.

Recidivist statutes
Gideon was historic in establishing a fundamental right to counsel,
but Gideon the man had been described as “a small-time gambler, a
sometime hobo, and an ‘ex-con.’”63 He was originally sentenced to
five years in prison due to four prior felony convictions that
elevated his sentence.64 Although his prior convictions were not at
issue, Gideon faced a longer sentence as a result of his past
criminal history.65
Individuals who have committed prior crimes often receive stricter
penalties than first-time offenders.66 Courts have long used an
individual’s criminal history to impose more severe sentences.67
Considerations of recidivism are contained both in statutes and
sentencing guidelines.68 For example, a state law can define an
offense and in a subsection require a mandatory minimum or a
maximum sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction.69 Most
states also implement sentencing guidelines.70 Guidelines prescribe a
range of punishments but generally do not obligate judges to impose
a penalty within this range.71 They do necessitate that a judge at least
63. Kamisar, supra note 55, at 344.
64. See Gideon Conference, supra note 49, at 35 (remarks of Dean Bruce R. Jacob);
see also ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 103 (Vintage Books ed., 1989) (1964)
(detailing Gideon’s prior burglary felonies).
65. Gideon Conference, supra note 49, at 35 (remarks of Dean Bruce R. Jacob).
66. See generally Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
332 (1965) (surveying the various procedures through which repeat offenders
are prosecuted).
67. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501–18 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing how courts have considered recidivism in sentencing since
the founding of the country).
68. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1149–50 (2010)
(providing an overview of how recidivism factors into state and federal statutes, as
well as state and federal sentencing guidelines).
69. See Joel W.L. Millar, Comment, Nichols v. United States, The Right to Counsel,
and Collateral Sentence Enhancement: In Search of a Rationale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1189,
1191–92 & nn.15–21 (1996) (giving examples of various ways states incorporate
recidivism into their laws: a Michigan law requires courts to increase the maximum
sentence to one and a half times its original when the defendant is convicted of a
previous felony; an Alabama law increases the severity of the felony conviction for
every previous felony conviction; a Georgia law enacts the maximum sentence against
a defendant convicted of a felony when he or she has been imprisoned for a previous
felony conviction).
70. See 2 PETER J. HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
ADJUDICATORY STAGE 171 (2012) (categorizing different types of state sentencing
guidelines, from purely voluntary to truly mandatory).
71. Id. (noting that even truly mandatory sentencing guidelines permit judges to
deviate under “the most extraordinary of circumstances”).
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take into account prior convictions when formulating a sentence.72
At the federal level, recidivism similarly factors into statutes creating
federal crimes,73 as well as federal sentencing guidelines.74
Proponents of recidivist statutes believe that increased penalties
punish repeat offenders for their continuing bad behavior.75 In
addition to providing retribution, such punishment also serves as
deterrence.76 Greater punishment is necessary to deter future crimes
because lesser penalties have not prevented their recurrence.77 The
Supreme Court has agreed that states have a valid interest “in dealing
in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have
shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of
society as established by its criminal law.”78 For example, the Court
has upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment for
the theft of three golf clubs, valued at $399 each, because the
offense was the defendant’s third.79 Eighth Amendment challenges
to the proportionality of such sentences as constituting cruel and
unusual punishment in comparison to the present offense are
usually unsuccessful.80
The Supreme Court has also considered Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy concerns in relation to recidivist penalties. The issue arises
due to the tension between laws that require consideration of past
crimes, and the double jeopardy clause, which provides, “nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
72. See id. at 175 (explaining that judges must consider the criminal history of
the defendant).
73. See Russell, supra note 68, at 1148 n.61 (listing federal statutes that include
considerations of recidivism, such as federal crimes of illegal reentry, firearms
possession, drug possession, three-strikes laws, and drug crimes at 8 U.S.C. § 1326, id.
§ 924(e), 21 U.S.C. § 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 3559, respectively).
74. Id. at 1144–45 (discussing how a defendant’s prior convictions can increase
both his criminal history points and adjusted offense level under the federal
sentencing guidelines).
75. See Millar, supra note 69, at 1193 (hypothesizing that repeat offenders are
considered more culpable than first-time offenders).
76. See Russell, supra note 68, at 1150–57 (explaining the goals of recidivist
statutes as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation).
77. See Millar, supra note 69, at 1193 (noting that repeat offenders’ increased
propensity to commit crime threatens societal safety).
78. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980).
79. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment because it was “not grossly disproportionate”
to the crime).
80. See JENNIFER E. WALSH, THREE STRIKES LAWS 83 (2007) (showing that of the
five most pivotal Supreme Court cases on Eighth Amendment challenges to recidivist
statutes, only two were found to violate the Eighth Amendment). But see, e.g., Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without parole for
a nonviolent repeat offender was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment
under the Eighth Amendment).
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jeopardy of life or limb.”81 The Court has ruled that recidivist
punishments do not subject defendants to double punishment for
the same offense.82 A longer sentence under a recidivist statute is
“not to be viewed as . . . [an] additional penalty for the earlier
crimes,” but as “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is
considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.”83
The Supreme Court used this reasoning in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States84 in discussing the use of recidivism as a sentencing
factor. Almendarez-Torres faced charges under a federal law making
it a crime for a deported alien to return to the United States.85 This
underlying offense led to a maximum prison sentence of two years.86
The statute furthermore authorized a maximum prison sentence of
twenty years if the person had been deported for an aggravated
felony conviction.87 Almendarez-Torres argued that the portion of
the statute dictating a higher penalty for the prior conviction was an
element of the federal crime, entitling him to heightened procedural
protections.88
In rejecting his claim, the Court distinguished
sentencing factors from elements of crimes.89 Recidivism, it noted, is
one of the most traditional bases for increasing a defendant’s
sentence.90 A statute’s incorporation of past criminal behavior does
not create a separate offense within the same law.91 The Court
reaffirmed that “recidivism does not relate to the commission of the
offense, but goes to the punishment only.”92
A subsequent case has indirectly complicated the issue of what role
prior convictions play in prosecution of present crimes, or what
recidivist statutes actually punish. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,93 the
Supreme Court once more tackled the “seemingly simple question of
81. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995) (ruling that
consideration of past criminal behavior does not impose punishment for the past
conduct for double jeopardy purposes).
83. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948).
84. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
85. Id. at 229 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239. Almendarez-Torres’ maintained that recidivism was an element of
the offense that must be included in the government’s indictment and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Id.
89. See id. at 243 (describing recidivism as “the sentencing factor at issue here”
(emphasis added)).
90. Id.
91. See id. at 226 (“We conclude that the [statutory subsection in question] is a
penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a
recidivist. It does not define a separate crime.”).
92. Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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what constitutes a ‘crime.’”94 Unlike the defendant in AlmendarezTorres, the defendant in Apprendi faced a higher sentence not due to
his past criminal history, but due to possessing a specific mental state
while committing the offense; that is, for having committed a hate
crime.95 The defendant fired a gun into the home of an AfricanAmerican family and pled guilty to two second-degree offenses and
one third-degree offense.96 Each second-degree offense carried a
maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment.97 The prosecution
sought to prove a biased purpose behind one of the second-degree
offenses, which could have increased the penalty for that count alone
to twenty years.98
The question on appeal involved
constitutionally-required procedural protections for the higher
sentence.99 The answer turned on whether the authorization of
the increased jail term was an element of the defendant’s crime,
or a penalty enhancement.100
The Court in Apprendi held that due process requires heightened
protections for any fact other than a conviction that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum
penalty.101 For Apprendi, this meant the circumstances of his
crime—other than the fact of a prior conviction—had to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.102 Prior convictions were
exempted for two reasons. First, the Court emphasized that prior
convictions are different from other factual circumstances
surrounding a crime because of “the certainty that procedural
safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction.”103 Second, the
Court admitted, “it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly

94. Id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. See id. at 468–69 (majority opinion) (describing the New Jersey “hate crime”
law, which imposed an extended prison term upon a preponderance of the evidence
that a defendant committed the crime with intent to intimidate based on “race,
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity” (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:44-3(e))).
96. Id. at 469.
97. Id. at 469. The defendant had entered a plea agreement allowing the third
sentence to run concurrently with the first two sentences. Id. at 469–70.
98. Id. at 469–70. The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year term for
his second offense, id. at 471, meaning the hate crime law led to a sentence two years
longer than the ten-year, statutorily prescribed maximum for that count. Id. at 469.
99. Id. at 475.
100. See id. at 492 (rejecting the State’s argument that the finding of bias was
merely a sentencing factor).
101. Id. at 490.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 488.
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decided.”104 While not expressly overruling its earlier decision, the
Court noted that the defendant in Almendarez-Torres admitted to the
prior convictions, which mitigated due process concerns.105 It
continued to speculate that if the question of prior convictions under
a recidivism statute was at issue, “a logical application of our
reasoning today should apply.”106
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed that the Court
incorrectly decided Almendarez-Torres.107 His opinion went further
than the majority in describing prior convictions as elements of
crimes:
[I]f the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for
increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some
aggravating fact—of whatever sort, including the fact of a prior
conviction—the core crime and the aggravating fact together
constitute an aggravated crime . . . . The aggravating fact is an
element of the aggravated crime.108

Although seemingly semantic, the distinction between elements
and sentencing factors has significant consequences. While a
sentencing factor increases a defendant’s punishment, it is not
subject to the constitutional protections of elements.109 Elements,
however, trigger protections such as the way in which defendants are
charged,110 the government’s burden of proof,111 and whether the
fact-finder is the judge or the jury.112

104. Id. at 489; see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A] majority of the Court
now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”).
105. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489–90 (noting that the Court need not revisit
Almendarez-Torres, as Apprendi did not contest the validity of that case).
106. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 531, 543 (2006) (acknowledging unfulfilled predictions since
Apprendi that the Supreme Court will overrule Almendarez-Torres).
107. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520–21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court’s approach of using tradition to determine whether a particular fact should
provide a basis for increasing a sentence “defines away the real issue”).
108. Id. at 501.
109. Id. at 500.
110. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (“An
indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. But it need not
set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the
charged crime.” (internal citations omitted)).
111. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) (upholding a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for sentencing factors, as opposed to the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required to prove elements of a crimes).
Scholars continue to challenge this standard post-Apprendi. See, e.g., Chemerinsky,
supra note 106, at 543 (describing recidivist crimes as imposing additional
punishment for prior convictions, “even though th[e prior] crime has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Colleen P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions
After Apprendi, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 994 (2004) (protesting lower courts’
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Post-Apprendi, there has been uncertainty regarding how to treat
different types of prior convictions under recidivist statutes.
Convictions from foreign jurisdictions are one example. Until 2005,
federal circuit courts were split on whether to count foreign
convictions as predicate offenses under an unlawful gun possession
statute.113 The Supreme Court eventually settled this question in
Small v. United States,114 where it presumed that the prohibition on
possession of firearms by a person “convicted in any court” referred
to domestic convictions.115 This decision was partially motivated by
concerns that convictions from different legal systems may
punish crimes more severely than in the United States, or that
the systems themselves are “inconsistent with an American
understanding of fairness.”116
Juvenile adjudications are another example of post-Apprendi
confusion over prior convictions. The Supreme Court has held that
the Constitution does not guarantee juveniles the right to a jury trial
in juvenile criminal proceedings.117
Due to this fundamental
difference between adult and juvenile criminal proceedings, federal
appellate courts are split on whether, post-Apprendi, prior
delinquency adjudications should be considered predicate offenses
under recidivism statutes.118 United States v. Tighe119 is the lone case
prohibiting such use. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Tighe acknowledged Apprendi’s differing treatment of
convictions compared to other factors that enhance sentences.120
assumptions that Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi limit the government’s burden of
proof for prior convictions to a preponderance of the evidence).
112. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (permitting prior convictions, in contrast to
elements of crimes, to be proven to a judge rather than to a jury).
113. Compare United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting
“convicted in any court” in the Federal Gun Control Act to exclude foreign
convictions), with United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 427 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003)
(upholding use of a Japanese conviction as a predicate offense under the same
statute), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), and United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th
Cir. 1989) (reading the plain language of “any court” to include foreign convictions).
The circuit split was eventually settled in Small, 544 U.S. 385, in which the Court held
the statute applied only to domestic convictions. Id. at 394.
114. 544 U.S. 385 (2005).
115. Id. at 387.
116. See id. at 389 (arguing that certain economic conduct punishable by
imprisonment in other countries may not violate domestic, American laws).
117. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Court reasoned
that “[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed
upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence.” Id. at 551.
118. See Murphy, supra note 111, at 1012–17 (exploring the effects of the Apprendi
decision on nonjury juvenile proceedings).
119. 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
120. See id. at 1192 (recognizing that prior convictions are excluded from
“Apprendi’s general rule and, as sentencing factors, need not be afforded the same
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Nevertheless, it declined to take into account the defendant’s prior
adjudication, which would have lengthened his sentence from a
maximum of 188 months to 235 months.121 By contrast, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Smalley122
permitted use of a nonjury juvenile adjudication to increase a
defendant’s sentence from a maximum of ten years to a
minimum of fifteen years. 123 The court noted other procedural
protections available to juveniles, like the right to counsel, which
made the adjudication sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
requirements of Apprendi.124
3. Challenging the use of uncounseled prior convictions under recidivist
statutes
The Supreme Court has also considered permissible uses of prior
convictions in relation to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The issue first arose in 1967 in Burgett v. Texas,125 where a state
recidivist statute subjected anyone with three prior felonies to life
imprisonment.126
Burgett had three prior convictions from
Tennessee and one from Texas.127 The prosecution introduced into
evidence a certified copy of one of these convictions, which suggested
Burgett had not been represented by counsel.128 The Court held that
use of the prior uncounseled felony conviction under the recidivist
statute violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.129 Without
much explanation, the Court found that “[t]o permit a conviction
obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a
person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense is to erode the principle of that case.”130

procedural protections that attach to facts that are construed as elements of the
charged crime”).
121. See id. at 1194–95 (limiting Apprendi to “prior convictions that were
themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).
122. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
123. See id. at 1031 (affirming the district court’s sentence).
124. See id. at 1033 (supporting its holding further by pointing to juvenile
defendants’ right to notice, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
privilege against self-incrimination).
125. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
126. Id. at 111 n.3 (referring to TEX. PENAL CODE art. 63 (1952)).
127. See id. at 111 (listing petitioner’s previous felony convictions, which included
three forgery convictions in Tennessee and one burglary conviction in Texas).
128. Id. at 112.
129. Id. at 114–15 (explaining that “the accused in effect suffers anew from the
deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right”).
130. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
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Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court issued two seemingly
contradictory opinions. First, in Lewis v. United States,131 the Court
considered use of an uncounseled felony conviction under a federal
statute that prohibited possession of a firearm by a former felon.132
Mindful of Burgett, the Court nevertheless held that the Sixth
Amendment did not prohibit use of the defendant’s prior felony
conviction, though it was uncounseled and resulted in
imprisonment.133 The Court distinguished Lewis from past precedent
by framing the federal gun law as imposing a “civil disability.”134 The
statute was not focused on concerns about the reliability of the prior
conviction, but on the “mere fact of conviction” in order to keep
firearms from dangerous individuals.135 The Court justified its
decision as distinct from using a prior conviction to “support guilt or
enhance punishment,” which was the issue in Burgett.136 While noting
that some uses of uncounseled convictions were impermissible, the
Court interpreted its past decisions as “never suggest[ing] that an
uncounseled conviction is invalid for all purposes.”137
Just two months later, the Court in Baldasar v. Illinois138 arrived at
the opposite conclusion. There, the defendant’s previous offense
meant that, under state law, his present misdemeanor offense could
be tried as a felony, with a penalty of one to three years of
imprisonment.139 However, in a per curiam opinion, the Court held
that the state could not use the defendant’s prior, uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to convert his current misdemeanor into a
felony.140 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart interpreted use of
the previous conviction as violating Scott.141 Misdemeanor convictions
that are obtained without the right to counsel and lead to

131. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
132. Id. at 56 (referring to 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1970)).
133. See id. at 66–67.
134. Id. at 67.
135. Id.; see also D. Brian King, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior
Convictions, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1386 (1989) (finding the difference between
Lewis and Burgett as the difference between the existence and the factual reliability of
a previous conviction).
136. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67 (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
The Court furthermore refused to recognize any inconsistency with Burgett. See id.
(distinguishing between Burgett and the current case, which it characterized as using
“an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil firearms disability,
enforceable by criminal sanction”).
137. Id. at 66–67.
138. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511
U.S. 738 (1994).
139. Id. at 223.
140. Id. at 224.
141. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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imprisonment violate the Sixth Amendment.142 In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall agreed that use of the prior
conviction violated Scott, but maintained that Scott was wrongly
decided.143 His opinion also pointed out that the defendant’s
imprisonment was not just a result of the present offense, but a direct
consequence of the prior uncounseled conviction.144 While Justices
Brennan and Stevens joined both concurrences,145 not all of the
Justices agreed. Comparing this case to Lewis, Justice Powell
protested that “[t]he conflict between the two holdings could
scarcely be more violent.”146
Lewis allowed the use of an
uncounseled felony conviction as a predicate for a subsequent
offense,147 while Baldasar prohibited the same use of an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.148
This conflict persisted until the Court explicitly overruled Baldasar
in Nichols v. United States.149 The defendant in Nichols had previously
been convicted of a misdemeanor for driving under the influence,
for which he paid a fine.150 After pleading guilty to the federal
offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine, a sentencing court assigned
him an extra criminal history point for his DUI.151 This point
increased his criminal history category and sentencing range under
the then-mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.152 The Court
upheld use of the uncounseled conviction to impose a greater
penalty in the increased sentencing range.153 It reasoned that “an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no
142. See id. (noting that the petitioner “was sentenced to an increased term of
imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in
which he had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense”).
143. Id. at 225 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating continuing disagreement with
the Court’s decision in Scott for the reasons set forth in Justice Brennan’s dissent).
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Scott argued that the right to counsel should apply where
imprisonment is an authorized or potential penalty, even if the sentencing process
results in a fine and no prison term. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 376, 382–89
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). To require otherwise would mean “a defendant will
have no right to appointed counsel even when he has a constitutional right to a jury
trial,” which he considered “simply an intolerable result.” Id. at 382.
144. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“That petitioner has
been deprived of his liberty ‘as a result of [the first] criminal trial’ could not be
clearer.” (alteration in original)).
145. Id. at 224.
146. Id. at 234 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
148. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224.
149. 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994).
150. Id. at 740.
151. Id.
152. Id. (explaining that an “additional criminal history point” increased the
petitioner’s maximum sentence from 210 months to 235 months).
153. Id. at 748–49.
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prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance
punishment at a subsequent conviction.”154 The Court adopted the
dissent’s view from Baldasar that enhancement statutes “do not
change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.”155 Rather,
according to the Court, they penalize only the last offense
Under this rationale, the
committed by the defendant.156
additional criminal history point did not result in any
imprisonment for the defendant’s prior misdemeanor. 157
Therefore, it did not violate the Sixth Amendment.158
Nichols seemed definitive until the Supreme Court decided Alabama
v. Shelton.159 In Shelton, the defendant was tried without assistance of
counsel, convicted of a misdemeanor, and sentenced to thirty days in
prison.160 Per an Alabama statute, the circuit court suspended the
sentence and placed the defendant on probation.161 Though the
defendant never went to jail, the Court considered the suspended
sentence the equivalent of a prison term.162 If the defendant violated
his probation, the uncounseled conviction would directly result in
imprisonment.163 Although dependent on a triggering condition—
violating probation—the court noted that the uncounseled
misdemeanor could “end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s
liberty.”164 The potential imposition of incarceration therefore
violated “the key Sixth Amendment inquiry:
whether the
adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is
sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration.”165
B. Prosecution of American Indian Defendants Under Federal Recidivism
Statutes
Debates persist about the effectiveness of legislation targeting
recidivists. Some scholars note inconclusive results from studies on
the relationship between punishment and increased occurrence of
crime.166
Others describe dramatically decreased crime rates
154. Id. at 749.
155. Id. at 747.
156. Id. (quoting Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 748–49.
159. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
160. Id. at 658.
161. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 15-22-50 (1995)).
162. See id. at 662 (“Once the prison term is triggered, the defendant is
incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying offense.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)).
165. Id. at 667.
166. See, e.g., NANCY RODRIGUEZ, PERSISTENT OFFENDER LAW: RACIAL DISPARITY,
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following the passage of three-strike laws.167 Recidivism rates are
particularly high for American Indians, exceeding those of other
populations in some states.168 Research also suggests that most
domestic violence against Indian women is committed by repeat
offenders.169 Holding domestic violence perpetrators accountable is
particularly difficult due to a complex web of federal legislation and
judicial decisions that control criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country.170 The interaction between these statutes and case law
controls whether federal, state, or tribal authorities may prosecute
certain types of crimes committed by Indians and non-Indians, as well
as Indian rights vis-à-vis their own tribes.
1.

Federal power in Indian country
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has described Indian nations as the
“third sovereign.”171 Their unique status stems from the fact that
Indian nations exist independently from federal or state
governments.172 Early treaties and the Supreme Court acknowledged
their inherent and independent sovereignty.173 However, federal
regulation has significantly interfered with this sovereignty in many
ways, making tribal nations more closely resemble “domestic
dependent nations.”174

PATTERNED OFFENSES, AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS 2–4 (2003) (exploring the nexus
between three strikes laws and theories of punishment).
167. See WALSH, supra note 80, at 134 (discussing a recent California study showing
a 45% drop in crime following adoption of three strikes legislation). Walsh also
notes the effects of increasing the cost of crime too much, which may lead to a
corresponding increase in certain crimes. Id. at 140.
168. See State Recidivism Studies, SENT’G PROJECT (2010), http://sentencingproject.org
/doc/publications/inc_StateRecidivismFinalPaginated.pdf (showing studies in Iowa
and Wisconsin, where recidivism rates are highest among Indian populations).
169. See Margaret S. Groban & Leslie A. Hagen, Domestic Violence Crimes in Indian
Country, U.S. ATTYS’ BULL., July 2010, at 2, 6, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao
/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5804.pdf (encouraging federal prosecutors to
target repeat offenders under 18 U.S.C. § 117).
170. See infra Part I.B.1 (setting forth the statutes and Supreme Court decisions
defining federal power over criminal jurisdiction in Indian country).
171. Sandra Day O’Connor, Remark, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
172. See id. (distinguishing the sovereignty and judicial systems of Indian tribes
from those of the Federal government and the States).
173. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogated by Nevada
v. Hicks, 535 U.S. 353 (2001) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force . . . .”). See generally Canby, supra note 29, at 105–23
(surveying Indian treaty rights from the first treaty with the Delawares in 1787).
174. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (concluding that
the Cherokee Nation cannot be considered a “foreign nation,” and that its
“relation[ship] to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian”).
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Federal authority over Indian affairs originates in the Constitution
from two sources. First, the Supreme Court has pointed to the
Executive Branch’s treaty powers, and the fact that treaties are the
main way the federal government has maintained relations with
Indian nations.175 The Constitution furthermore allows Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.176 This so-called Indian
Commerce Clause “provide[s] Congress with plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”177 States have no authority in
this area without an express grant of power from Congress. 178
Through the years, Congress has legislated many aspects of tribal
sovereignty, including tribal nations’ exercise of criminal
jurisdiction, as well as personal rights enjoyed by Indian members
vis-à-vis tribal governments.
a.

Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country

Since the Nineteenth century, Congress has extended federal
jurisdiction to crimes committed in Indian country through its
plenary authority over Indian affairs. The General Crimes Act of
1817179 applied federal criminal law to the Indian territories.180 In
1825, the Assimilative Crimes Act181 further provided that if a crime
was not enumerated in federal legislation, the offender could still be
prosecuted in federal court under state laws.182 Together, these two
175. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (identifying the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause as two sources of federal power over Indian
tribes); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes . . . .”).
177. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
178. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sovereign Comity: Factors Recognizing Tribal Court
Criminal Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. 12, 13 (2009), available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr45-1-2/CR45-1-2Fletcher.pdf (naming
the three main principles in federal Indian law as (1) Congress having exclusive
power over Indian affairs; (2) states enjoying no such power without Congressional
delegation; and (3) Indian tribes possessing inherent sovereignty that is nevertheless
subject to limitation by Congress).
179. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (2012)).
180. See id. (“[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.”).
181. Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, 4 Stat. 115 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 13).
182. See id. (“[A]ny act or omission which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is
situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.”).
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pieces of legislation continue to allow the federal government to
prosecute all crimes in Indian country in federal court, with three
exceptions: (1) when an Indian commits a crime against another
Indian, (2) when an Indian has already been punished by tribal
law, and (3) when the federal government grants jurisdiction to an
Indian tribe.183
Based on these exceptions, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
federal government did not properly exercise jurisdiction over a
Brule Sioux Indian who shot and killed another Brule Sioux in Ex
parte Crow Dog.184 After Crow Dog’s tribal council dealt with his
offense under their traditional law, federal authorities subsequently
arrested and tried him for murder under federal law.185 Without
jurisdiction under the General Crimes Act, the Court granted Crow
Dog’s habeas petition.186 The decision sparked public outrage over
what was perceived as an acquittal. 187 In response, Congress
passed another law two years later: the Major Crimes Act. 188 This
statute specified several offenses over which the federal
government would assume exclusive jurisdiction, including
murder.189 It left enforcement of these serious crimes in the
hands of the federal government.190
The federal government continues to enjoy jurisdiction over
serious crimes, except where it has transferred this power to states
under what is known as Public Law 280.191 In the 1950s, Congress
experimented with granting states the authority to prosecute crimes
in Indian country.192 Public Law 280 mandated this transfer among
six states and extended the option to others, without the consent of
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
184. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
185. See David Patton, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010: Breathing Life into the
Miner’s Canary, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 767, 770 (2012) (describing the facts of Crow Dog).
186. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572 (finding no congressional intent to depart from
the government’s general policy of allowing tribes to adjudicate crimes committed by
Indians against each other).
187. Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Sentencing, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 61
(2011) (noting the public perception of acquittal).
188. Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1153).
189. Id. § 1153(a). The other offenses are manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming,
incest, various types of assaults, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, and
robbery. Id.
190. Id.
191. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)).
192. See generally Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1639–56 (1998) (providing a
comprehensive background on Public Law 280).
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Indian tribes.193 Despite hopes that states might better handle law
enforcement, and that law enforcement would be easier if tribes
were subject to state laws, crime rates did not improve.194 Public
Law 280 is widely considered a failure.195 Nonetheless, Public Law
280 jurisdiction still exists in several states, which assume
prosecution of crimes committed by and against Indians, as
opposed to the federal government.196
Congress expanded federal and state criminal jurisdiction while
the Supreme Court simultaneously restricted the jurisdiction of tribal
governments in several decisions. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,197 the Court held that tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction
to try and punish non-Indians.198 Later, in Duro v. Reina,199 the Court
even divested tribal governments of jurisdiction over Indians not
enrolled in the same tribe.200 In response, Congress amended the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968201 (“ICRA”) to restore the ability of
tribal governments to prosecute all Indians, regardless of tribal
enrollment in what is known as the “Duro fix”.202 Recently, Congress
also granted tribal courts jurisdiction over non-Indians in domestic
violence cases, subject to certain conditions.203 In other words, the
193. See id. at 1632–33 (Minnesota, Alaska, California, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
Oregon); see also Patton, supra note 185, at 774 (describing that tribal consent was
not necessary for states to assume jurisdiction from the federal government).
194. See Patton, supra note 185, at 774–75 (explaining how Public Law 280 acted as
an unfunded mandate that did not improve law enforcement in Indian country).
195. See Jiménez & Song, supra note 192, at 1636 (noting that even Congress
considers Public Law 280 a failure).
196. See id. at 1679–83 (discussing two cases in which courts have found
concurrent tribal jurisdiction under Public Law 280 in California and New York).
197. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
198. Id. at 195, 208–11 (reasoning that Indian tribes are within the geographic
limits of the United States and thus are subordinate to the sovereignty of the United
States). As a result, criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians can only be granted by an
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress. Id. at 208.
199. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
200. See id. at 679 (holding that “the retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political
and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the authority to
impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership”).
201. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tits. II–VII, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18
and 25 U.S.C.).
202. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b)–(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892–
93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)-(4) (2012)).
203. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
§ 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120–22 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304). Tribal jurisdiction
over domestic violence crimes by non-Indians is predicated on the provision of jury
trials, and the right to counsel where any term of imprisonment is imposed. Id., 127
Stat. at 122 (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2)–(3)); see also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Tracing the Right to Counsel in the VAWA Reauthorization Act, TURTLE TALK
(Feb. 28, 2013), available at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/tracingthe-right-to-counsel-in-the-vawa-reauthorization-act/ (explaining that the 2013
Reauthorization Act incorporates protections from the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1302); Part I.B.b (detailing how the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
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same principle behind the “defeasance” of Indian jurisdiction is valid
today.204 Tribal sovereignty is inherent but subject to restrictions by
Congress that control the “metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.”205
In sum, the federal government retains jurisdiction over nonIndians who commit crimes in Indian country and over Indians who
commit major crimes. In mandatory Public Law 280 jurisdictions,
this authority instead resides with states. Indian tribes thus retain
jurisdiction to prosecute non-major crimes committed by Indians and
certain domestic violence crimes committed by non-Indians.
b.

Constitutional rights of American Indians and the gap in Sixth
Amendment right to counsel

Through this complex jurisdictional web, Congress’s exercise of
plenary authority in Indian affairs subjects Indian members to three
different sovereigns’ laws: federal, state, and tribal governments.206
An overlap also exists when it comes to laws protecting individual
Indian rights. Since 1924, the U.S. government has recognized
Indians as American citizens who enjoy the same constitutional
guarantees as any other U.S. citizen.207 At the same time, the
Supreme Court has held since 1896 that the Constitution does not
apply to tribal nations.208 This means that the Constitution does not
obligate tribal governments to apply any Bill of Rights protections to
their tribal members.209 While the Fourteenth Amendment has
selectively incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states,210 the
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to include more defendants’ rights). This grant
of jurisdiction was highly controversial, impeding renewal of the Violence Against
Women Act for fear that tribes were incapable of granting fair trials to non-Indians.
See Timothy Egan, Science and Sensibility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013, 9:00 PM), available at
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/science-and-sensibility (highlighting
the antiquated view of Senator Charles Grassley, among other Republican
Representatives).
204. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
205. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
206. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the interplay of federal, state, and tribal laws).
207. See The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253,
(granting Indians American citizenship while maintaining their tribal property
rights) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
208. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (ruling that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to the Cherokee Nation because the powers of the
Cherokee government existed prior to the formation of the Constitution, and the
“sole object” of the Fifth Amendment is to restrain the powers of the federal
government); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)
(reaffirming the notion that constitutional provisions do not apply to tribal nations).
209. See generally Vincent C. Milani, Note, The Right to Counsel in Native American
Tribal Courts: Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Control, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279,
1284–85 (1994) (debating whether Congress should impose the right to counsel on
tribal governments).
210. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 499–
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process of incorporation did not proceed in the same way for tribal
nations.211 It is for this reason that Indians, as U.S. citizens, enjoy the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in federal and state courts, but
not in tribal courts.
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act212 in 1968 as a
response to this civil rights loophole, but the law did not solve the
right-to-counsel gap. Beginning in 1961, reports of civil rights abuses
committed by tribal governments against their members triggered
hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.213
Inadequacy of tribal courts was one theme of the hearings, with
concern for “uneducated” judges who were not legally trained.214
The Subcommittee was also alarmed at what it perceived as lack of
independence between branches of tribal governments.215
Representatives testified to concerns about tribal councils appointing
judges, and also in some cases appeals from court decisions to the
council itself.216 As a result, Congress decided to limit tribal courts’
sentencing authority to $500 and/or six months in jail.217 More
generally, Congress felt the need to prohibit “action by a tribal
government that would be unconstitutional if undertaken by the
Federal, State, or local governments.”218
The goal of the ICRA was to create parity between the civil rights of
Indians and non-Indian U.S. citizens.219 The law extended some, but
not all, of the Bill of Rights obligations to tribal governments.220 Both
505 (3d ed. 2006) (detailing the cases through which the Supreme Court concluded
that certain Bill of Rights provisions became enforceable against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
211. See Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1706–07 (2012)
(comparing the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to states with its effect on tribal
governments). Because the sovereignty of the Indian tribes existed before the
formation of the United States Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment did not
extend the Bill of Rights to the tribes. Id.
212. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tits. II-VII, 82 Stat. 73, 73–81 (1968) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
213. See Riley, supra note 211, at 1705. The Committee also received “disturbing”
reports of civil rights violations by state and federal governments. Id.
214. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tightening the Perceived “Loophole”: Reexamining ICRA’s
Limitation on Tribal Court Punishment Authority, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT
FORTY 211, 223–25 (Kristen A. Carpenter et al. eds., 2012).
215. See id. at 219–21 (presenting congressional testimony on the intermingling of
tribal legislative, executive, and judiciary branches).
216. See id. at 220 (quoting Representative Berry on the perceived arbitrary nature
of tribal councils’ powers).
217. See id. at 217–19 (positing a second theory that Congress likely also
thought it was codifying, rather than limiting, tribal governments’ existing
sentencing authority).
218. Riley, supra note 211, at 1707.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 1707–08 (explaining the absence of a right to grand jury indictment,
jury trial, and counsel).
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tribal leaders and government officials expressed concerns about the
inapplicability of select rights.221 For example, an equivalent of the
Establishment Clause was omitted out of respect for theocratic
governance.222 Out of concern for lack of resources, the ICRA did
not include a parallel Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent
defendants.223 It is unclear whether tribes themselves were concerned
about their inability to provide attorneys in criminal proceedings, or
if the Bureau of Indian Affairs advocated against this inclusion,
fearful that the expense would fall to the Bureau.224 Nevertheless,
the ICRA required that a defendant be afforded the right to an
attorney “at his own expense.”225 Where a defendant could not
afford counsel, the ICRA did not compel it.226 Since 1968, tribal
courts’ sentencing authority has been raised to $5000 in fines
and/or one year of imprisonment,227 but the right to counsel was
not amended until recently.
In 2010, Congress passed what amounts to a partial Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for Indians. Other than a 1990
amendment to the ICRA, the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010228
(“TLOA”) is the first major piece of legislation to address law
enforcement in Indian country since the 1968 ICRA. The law
acknowledges an epidemic of domestic and sexual violence against
American Indian women and seeks to empower tribal governments to
provide better public safety.229 A major change is that the statute now
allows tribal courts to prosecute felonies.230 It increases tribal courts’
sentencing authority to $15,000 and three years of imprisonment.231
221. See id. at 1707 (noting Congress’s attention to differences between Indian
and Anglo governments).
222. See id. (suggesting tribal elders from the southwestern Pueblos were especially
influential in omitting a parallel Establishment Clause).
223. See id. at 1707–08 (noting funding concerns related to the rights to grand
jury, jury trial, and counsel).
224. Compare id. at 1707 (discussing only tribal governments’ concerns about
funding defense counsel), with Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts
and Public Defenders 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 1, 2003-2004, at 139, 144–45
(stating that omission of a right to counsel was motivated by federal government
concerns that it would have to eventually fund tribal public defenders).
225. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2012).
226. Id.
227. See Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, tit. IV.C, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-137, 3207-146 (amending 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7)) (revising the statute to provide for imprisonment of no greater than “a
term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both”).
228. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
229. See id. § 202, 124 Stat. 2262, reprinted in 25 U.S.C. 2801 note (stating the
congressional findings).
230. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b)).
231. Id.
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In order to take advantage of this provision, tribal courts must also
provide certain procedural safeguards, including “the right to
effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.”232 The statute furthermore obligates
tribal governments “at the expense of the tribal government, [to]
provide an indigent defendant the assistance of a defense attorney
licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States that
applies appropriate professional licensing standards and effectively
ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its licensed
attorneys.”233 Although much of the language is unclear, defense
counsel under this provision must be a licensed attorney, not a lay
advocate as is the practice in many tribes.234
TLOA’s partial Sixth Amendment right applies in prosecution of
felonies and repeat offender crimes.235 Tribal courts may continue to
prosecute misdemeanors, and sentence one-year jail terms, without
providing defense counsel.236 Just how successful this partial Sixth
Amendment right will prove remains to be seen.
The U.S.
Government Accountability Office reported in May 2012 that
approximately 36% of federally recognized Indian tribes plan to take
advantage of the new guidelines.237 They have not done so thus far,
citing funding concerns.238 Administrative considerations have also
been a barrier, such as revising internal procedural codes to comply
with TLOA’s various provisions.239 On August 28, 2012, the Hopi
tribe adopted a new criminal code, becoming the first tribe in a
position to implement TLOA’s increased sentencing authority.240

232. Id. § 1302(c)(1).
233. Id. § 1302(c)(2).
234. See Patton, supra note 185, at 786 (characterizing the majority of defense
work in Indian country as provided by Indian Legal Services or lay advocates).
235. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
236. Id. § 1302.
237. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT
3 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591213.pdf.
238. Id. at 8 (presenting data that 96% of tribes most frequently identified limited
funding as a challenge to implementing TLOA’s increased sentencing authority).
239. Id. (indicating that 37% of tribes reported needing to revise their internal
codes to comply with TLOA).
240. See Anne Minard, A Leader Emerges: Hopi Tribe Adopts New Criminal Code According to
Tribal Law and Order Act Standards, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 3,
2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/09/03/a-leader-emerges-hopi
-tribe-adopts-new-criminal-code-according-to-tribal-law-and-order-act-standards-132160
(detailing the Hopi Tribal Council’s decision and vote).
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2. Uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist
statutes
United States v. Cavanaugh241 illustrates the difficulties encountered
when prior convictions obtained in tribal court are used as predicate
offenses under recidivist statutes in federal court. Cavanaugh was a
member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and indicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 117.242 At least two prior convictions for assault are a precondition
of this federal crime,243 and Cavanaugh had been previously
convicted of three misdemeanor domestic abuse offenses in 2005 and
2008, for which he served prison sentences.244 In those cases, he was
advised of his right to counsel but not represented by a lawyer.245
Despite noting that “Supreme Court authority in this area is
unclear,”246 the Eighth Circuit ultimately held that these prior
convictions “may be used to prove the elements of § 117.”247
The Eighth Circuit analyzed Cavanaugh’s challenge to the use of
his prior conviction through two frameworks. First, the court
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.248 It particularly emphasized that Nichols permitted an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a defendant’s
punishment.249 The Nichols court adopted the view that recidivism
statutes punish only the present offense, and that any imprisonment
for the present offense cannot be traced back to any prior
convictions.250 Therefore, according to the court, because the
additional criminal history point assigned to the defendant in Nichols
did not result in any imprisonment attributable to the prior
misdemeanor, no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred.251 By
refusing to follow the chain of causation from the prior misdemeanor

241. 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
242. Id. at 594. The district court dismissed Cavanaugh’s indictment, which the
Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. at 593, 594. Cavanaugh eventually pled guilty. Fort
Totten Man Sentenced, supra note 3.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2012) (applying to “[a]ny person who commits a domestic
assault within the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country
and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State,
or Indian trial court proceedings”).
244. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593–94.
245. Id. at 594.
246. Id. at 605.
247. Id. at 594.
248. See id. at 597–603 (describing Supreme Court precedent as inconclusive on
the question of whether a valid tribal court conviction could be used to prove the
elements of a § 117 violation).
249. Id. at 599–600.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 599.
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convictions, no jail sentence occurred to violate Scott’s holding that
an uncounseled misdemeanor may not lead to imprisonment.252
Using this reasoning, the court in Cavanaugh extrapolated from
Nichols the broad proposition that a prior uncounseled conviction
may be used as a determinative factor in sentencing as long as no
constitutional violation has occurred. It explained, “[p]ost-Nichols . . .
it is arguable that the fact of an actual constitutional violation is,
perhaps, not only an important factor for determining when a prior
conviction may be used for sentence enhancement purposes, but a
required or controlling factor.”253 In arriving at this test, the court
also distinguished Nichols from Lewis, describing Lewis as “another
line of cases that address the use of prior convictions . . . to establish
the actual elements of subsequent offenses.”254 The court did not
elaborate on the difference between sentencing factors and elements
but noted “where the subsequent use [of a conviction] is to prove the
actual elements of a criminal offense, Nichols is of questionable
applicability, given that Court’s emphasis on the differences between
sentencing and guilt determinations.”255
After raising the above distinction, Cavanaugh shifted its analysis
from Sixth Amendment law to federal Indian law. Armed with its
generalization from Nichols—that a constitutionally-obtained prior
conviction may enhance a sentence—it found that Cavanaugh
qualified for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 117.256 Although
Cavanaugh’s prior convictions were uncounseled, they occurred in
tribal court, where the Constitution does not confer the right to
court-appointed counsel.257 Just as Nichols’ imprisonment did not
violate the Sixth Amendment, neither did Cavanaugh’s prior
convictions.258 Due to the nature of federal Indian law, Cavanaugh’s
prior convictions were actually “outside the bounds of the United
States Constitution.”259
252. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979), in the context of the development of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
253. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601.
254. Id. at 602.
255. Id. at 601.
256. See id. at 604–05 (noting that a court cannot necessarily preclude a conviction
simply because it would have been invalid had it occurred in a state or federal court).
257. Id. at 601, 606.
258. See id. at 603–04 (according “substantial weight to the fact that Cavanaugh’s”
convictions did not violate the Constitution). But see id. at 603 (indicating that
Nichols might not be dispositive of this case, because it did not involve a guilt phase
determination).
259. Id. at 603 n.7. The court was also swayed by “Cavanaugh’s counsel stat[ing]
clearly at oral argument that Cavanaugh alleges no irregularities with his tribal-court
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To further support this point, the majority referenced a state court
decision, State v. Spotted Eagle.260 The defendant in Spotted Eagle had
been convicted and jailed four times for driving under the influence
of alcohol.261 Under a state recidivist statute, his present offense, a
fifth DUI, was eligible to be prosecuted as a felony.262 The court
emphasized that principles of comity obligated it to recognize the
validity of Spotted Eagle’s previous convictions, which were
properly obtained under Blackfeet law. 263 It declared that “[t]o
disregard a valid tribal court conviction would imply that
Montana only recognizes the Blackfeet Tribe’s right to selfgovernment until it conflicts with Montana law.”264 According to
this reasoning, using the prior convictions to increase Spotted
Eagle’s offense from a misdemeanor to a felony exhibited
“deference to tribal sovereignty.”265
The Spotted Eagle dissent viewed these sovereignty considerations
from the opposite point of view. Judge Leaphart argued, “[i]n true
oxymoronic fashion, our Court has said to Mr. Spotted Eagle, ‘Out of
deference to your Tribe, we accord you fewer protections than
guaranteed to individual citizens by the Montana Constitution.’”266
Despite Judge Leaphart’s argument, his perspective remains the
minority view. In another federal appellate decision, considerations
of sovereignty even led to treatment of tribal convictions as the same
as those obtained from foreign jurisdictions. In United States v.
Shavanaux,267 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
described the parallels between tribal and foreign nations: both are
sovereigns to which the Bill of Rights does not apply.268 Instead of
relying on the Constitution for its analysis, the court instead
referenced the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.269 It did not
proceedings other than the denial of counsel (which was not a violation of any tribal
or federal law).” Id.
260. 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
261. Id. at 1241.
262. See id. (“[A] defendant who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent DUI is
guilty of a felony rather than a misdemeanor.” (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-731
(2001))).
263. Id. at 1245.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1246.
266. Id. at 1246 (Leaphart, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1246–47 (arguing that
using an uncounseled DUI conviction to increase a later DUI to felony status violates
the Montana Constitution).
267. 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
268. Id. at 998.
269. See id. at 999 (insisting that “in the due process context, federal courts have
analogized Indian tribes to foreign states in considering whether to recognize the
civil judgments of tribal courts,” which are determined under “principles of comity
derived from foreign relations law”).
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consider the previous tribal court conviction to be a foreign
judgment obtained by procedures incompatible with due process of
law.270 Thus, Shavanaux’s conviction was not improperly used in federal
court to support his subsequent conviction as a repeat offender.271
Tribal sovereignty has been invoked both for and against
recognizing tribal convictions in federal court. Perhaps partially to
avoid this debate, the Ninth Circuit reframed this issue not as one of
sovereignty, but as one of constitutional requirements in federal
criminal proceedings.272 In its decision in United States v. Ant,273 the
Ninth Circuit became the only federal appellate court that has
refused to use a prior conviction, obtained without assistance of
counsel in tribal court, to support a subsequent conviction in federal
court.274 While investigating a homicide, the Bureau of Indian affairs
and tribal police went to Ant’s house and obtained his confession.275
After entering a guilty plea in tribal court, Ant later faced a federal
charge of manslaughter.276 Because Ant was not represented by
counsel when he entered the plea, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s refusal to suppress the plea.277
Against a dissent that emphasized the “dignity shown to foreign
courts,”278 the majority in Ant would not use the plea to support the
defendant’s guilt in the manslaughter proceedings. Simply put, the
guilty plea “would have been in violation of the Sixth Amendment
had it been made in federal court.”279 The court recognized that the
ICRA did not require the court to provide counsel for Ant.280 Still, it
preferred to treat the case as if the Sixth Amendment applied.281 The
court did not view its decision as undermining principles of comity.282
It reasoned that declining to consider the tribal court conviction in
federal court did not invalidate the judgment for tribal nations’

270. Id. at 1000.
271. Id.
272. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) (evaluating the
tribal court proceedings’ conformity to the Constitution rather than the tribal
conviction).
273. 882 F.2d 1389.
274. Id. at 1396.
275. Id. at 1390.
276. Id. at 1390–91.
277. Id. at 1396.
278. Id. at 1396 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (majority opinion).
280. See id. at 1392, 1396 (accepting “the district court’s finding as to the validity
of the guilty plea under tribal law and the ICRA”).
281. Id. at 1396.
282. Id.
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purposes.283 The court ultimately concluded, “we have simply
evaluated whether that plea meets the requirements of the
United States Constitution for use in a federal prosecution in
federal court.”284
II. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD NOT USE UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL
COURT CONVICTIONS TO SUPPORT PROSECUTION OF RECIDIVIST
CRIMES
Prior tribal court convictions, when used in federal criminal
proceedings, should be treated as if the Sixth Amendment applies.
Where an indigent Indian defendant is convicted in tribal court in
the absence of counsel, this conviction should not serve as a predicate
offense in federal court. Using a prior conviction in this way ignores
concerns about its reliability. To bypass such concerns, some courts
refer to prior convictions as sentencing factors instead of elements of
crimes—a rationale apparently justifying a lower standard of
constitutional protection.285 Alternatively, they eschew discussion of
criminal law in favor of emphasizing that Indian nations are
sovereign and not constrained by the Bill of Rights.286 However,
reliability concerns underlie any analysis of uncounseled convictions
used in federal criminal proceedings, whether approached through
Sixth Amendment or federal Indian law jurisprudence.
A. United States v. Cavanaugh Ignores Concerns About the Reliability of
Prior Convictions Obtained Without Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has always rested on
concerns of reliability. The idea of reliability stems from the
circumstances of the Supreme Court’s first decision involving the
right to counsel, which cited the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed
to the Sixth Amendment.287 The Supreme Court has quoted its
decision in Powell in all of its subsequent major Sixth Amendment

283. Id. (emphasizing that suppression of Ant’s tribal court plea would not
“disparage tribal proceedings”).
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998)
(describing recidivism as a typical sentencing factor).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011)
(noting that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes and instead adopting
an analysis under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
287. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (confronting “whether the
denial of the assistance of counsel contravenes the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution”).
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cases.288 In Powell, the Court addressed whether the right to an
attorney was of such a fundamental nature that it should be extended
to the states under the Due Process Clause.289 The Court found such
assistance crucial,290 and this language flowed through its opinions
regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the next fifty years.291
Cases challenging the treatment of prior convictions under
recidivist statutes explicitly refer to reliability concerns.292 If counsel
is necessary to a fair trial and general due process in criminal
proceedings, and if counsel is not provided, the conviction is
therefore not fairly obtained. It is “unreliable” in the sense that the
defendant may have had a valid defense but was unable to articulate
it.293 This unreliability can taint even subsequent offenses, as Justice
Marshall discussed in his concurrence in Baldasar: “An uncounseled
conviction does not become more reliable merely because the
accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent offense.”294 Until
Nichols was decided in 1994, courts viewed an enhanced prison
sentence based on a prior tainted conviction as causing the
defendant to “suffer[] anew” from lack of counsel.295
The Cavanaugh decision mistakenly shifted its analysis away from
reliability concerns. The Eighth Circuit’s logic rested on the simple
theory that the Supreme Court permits a court to impose an
enhanced sentence on the basis of a legally-obtained prior
conviction.296 Thus, if Cavanaugh’s prior tribal court conviction was
obtained without a constitutional violation, then it properly served as
a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 117.297 However, this rationale
ignores the original intent behind the right to counsel.
288. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 754–55 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370–71
(1979) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 52); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33–34
(1972) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45
(1963) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463
(1938) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69).
289. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69.
290. See supra notes 35–47 (describing the Court’s reasoning in Powell).
291. See supra note 288.
292. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (characterizing Burgett,
Tucker, and Loper as relying on concerns about the reliability of prior convictions).
293. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (contending that without counsel, an innocent
person “faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence”).
294. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
295. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
296. But see United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (“In any
event, the most we take [away] . . . is that Supreme Court authority in this area is
unclear . . . .”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
297. Id.
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Cavanaugh’s
constitutionality
argument
relies
on
a
mischaracterization of Nichols. The Cavanaugh court described the
Nichols majority as having “rejected arguments that formed one of the
foundations for Gideon—arguments based on concerns about prior
convictions’ reliability.”298
The Cavanaugh court reached this
conclusion by determining that the Nichols majority did not reference
reliability concerns.299 The Eighth Circuit pointed to the fact that the
Nichols majority opinion rejected the dissent’s reliability rationale and
that no other Justices in the majority joined Justice Souter’s
concurring discussion of reliability.300 The Eighth Circuit therefore
viewed as dispositive the test of whether the prior conviction was
constitutionally infirm: “Our approach is, admittedly, categorical in
nature rather than firmly rooted in the reliability concerns expressed
in Gideon.”301
The Court in Nichols, however, did not ignore concerns about the
reliability of a defendant’s prior conviction. The Court simply
allowed prior uncounseled convictions to be used as sentencing
factors as long as the uncounseled conviction had not resulted in
imprisonment.302 Reliance on the conviction was a valid concern in
Nichols but was mitigated by two factors. First, the predicate
conviction did not result in any deprivation of liberty.303 This is the
principle underlying Scott and Argersinger, which characterized
imprisonment as different from other punishments, such as monetary
fines.304 Assistance of counsel is fundamentally important in cases
involving the “severe” sanction of incarceration.305 Conversely,
reliability could be overlooked where no deprivation of liberty
occurred.306 The Court did not dispense with the reliability concerns
articulated in Scott, but rather made a policy decision not to impose

298. Id. at 600.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 604.
302. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994).
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[W]e believe that the
central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and
warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel.”); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (“[T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be
viewed by the accused as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter.” (quoting Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970))).
305. Id. at 372.
306. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49 (permitting this outcome as consistent with the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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on states the cost of appointing counsel in cases where no deprivation
of liberty resulted.307
The Nichols Court also found that reliability concerns were
mitigated by the fact that the defendant was assigned extra criminal
history points at his sentencing hearing.308 The Court stated that
“[r]eliance on such a [prior] conviction is . . . consistent with the
traditional understanding of the sentencing process, which we have
often recognized as less exacting than the process of establishing
guilt.”309
Sentencing judges have traditionally enjoyed wide
discretion to consider many different factors in calculating an
appropriate sentence.310 Courts can also take past criminal behavior
into account irrespective of a final conviction.311 The implication in
Nichols was that it would not be a significant departure from the
traditional sentencing process to allow a sentencing judge to
increase a defendant’s criminal history score using a prior
conviction.312
In this way, the Nichols Court accounted for
reliability concerns but once more found them mitigated by
relaxed standards in the sentencing context.
Since Nichols, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that this relaxed
standard is inapplicable when questioning “whether the defendant
may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable because the
defendant had access” to counsel.313 In Shelton, the Court concluded
that a suspended prison sentence could lead to a deprivation of
liberty if the defendant violated his parole terms.314 The only
intermediate step between the uncounseled conviction and
imprisonment was this potential triggering event. In Nichols, the
intervening event between the defendant’s uncounseled conviction
and imprisonment was his commission of another offense.315 While
both cases contain parallels, the Court ruled in opposite ways. This
inconsistency leads to the question of when a conviction should be
treated as enhancing a sentence in the “less exacting” sentencing

307. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (noting that the extension of the right to counsel to
all misdemeanor cases—even those that do not result in imprisonment—would
impose “necessarily substantial” costs on states).
308. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747.
309. Id.
310. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 747–48 (observing that the defendant’s sentence enhancement did not
depend on whether he was actually convicted of the prior DUI offense, but could
have been imposed upon showing past criminal “behavior”).
313. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665 (2002).
314. Id. at 662.
315. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740–41.
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context.316 That is, what is the difference between a sentencing factor
and an element of a crime?
B. A Reliability Analysis Dictates that Prior Convictions Should Be Treated
like Elements of Crimes
The Cavanaugh court referred interchangeably to prior convictions
as sentencing factors and elements. It implied that prior tribal court
convictions are sentencing factors, but the opinion is filled with
inexact language. For example, the court drew a distinction between
cases like Nichols and “another line of cases that address the use of
prior convictions or prior civil adjudications to establish the actual
elements of subsequent offenses.”317 It similarly acknowledged that
when a prior conviction is used to “prove the elements of a criminal
offense,” Nichols is not controlling,318 thereby indicating treatment of
sentencing factors in the current case. At the same time, Cavanaugh
ultimately held that prior tribal court convictions “may be used to
prove the elements of § 117.”319
The Cavanaugh court’s varying use of language is similar to, and
likely a result of, the Supreme Court’s vacillation on how to describe
prior convictions.320 The Supreme Court originally prohibited judges
from using uncounseled convictions as a way “to support guilt or
enhance punishment.”321 In subsequent cases, such convictions have
been treated in a variety of ways: as a factor that “transformed”322 a
misdemeanor into a felony, as a “mere fact”323 upon which a federal
offense is predicated, and as a factor leading to an enhanced
punishment in sentencing proceedings.324 The Court’s varying usage
reflects its indecision regarding whether a prior conviction is an
indispensable element of the present offense, or a factor to be taken
into account when imposing a greater sentence on the defendant for
repeated illegal conduct.

316. “Less exacting” than what is required to prove guilt. Id. at 747.
317. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 602 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
318. Id. at 595, 601.
319. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
320. See generally Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and
Elements of a Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1402–13 (2001) (tracing the Supreme
Court’s historical treatment of sentencing factors and elements).
321. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (emphasis added).
322. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (per
curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
323. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980).
324. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746–47.
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The decision in Apprendi sheds some light on this issue and
suggests that Cavanaugh’s prior convictions are elements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 117. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas surveyed cases since the
founding of the United States to conclude that in the earliest days, no
distinction existed between elements of crimes and sentencing
enhancement factors.325 All of these cases support the idea that
crimes simply consist of “any fact to which punishment attaches.”326
Indeed, the idea of sentencing enhancement factors did not exist
until 1986.327 History therefore “establishes that a ‘crime’ includes
every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment.”328 Once the elements are determined, courts need
only apply the constitutional right at issue.329
The four conditions necessary to commit a crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 117 are: (1) a present offense of domestic assault; (2) committed
within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
or Indian country; (3) by someone with at least two final convictions
on separate prior occasions in federal, state, or Indian tribal court
proceedings; (4) when that prior offense was one of assault, sexual
abuse, or a serious violent felony against a spouse or intimate
partner.330 If a crime “includes every fact that is by law a basis for
imposing or increasing punishment,”331 then the prior convictions
referenced in § 117 are an integral part of the crime. Although
addressing a different aspect of the Sixth Amendment, the
concurrence’s reasoning in Apprendi—that an aggravating fact is an
element of a crime—has dual application to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.332 Crimes consist of “any fact to which punishment
attaches,”333 and punishment is only achieved under § 117 by the
existence of prior convictions.334
The Apprendi concurrence explicitly supports treatment of prior
convictions as elements. This conclusion is also supported as a
325. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
326. Id. at 515.
327. See id. at 485 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that the term “sentencing
factor” was first used in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
328. Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
329. Id; see also supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (discussing the
different constitutional protections applied to proving elements of crimes, as
opposed to sentencing factors).
330. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).
331. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 501.
333. Id. at 515.
334. But see United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2005) (arguing
that recidivism involves “the status of a defendant as a repeat offender,” not the
current offenses being tried).
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logical extension of the Apprendi majority opinion, which is
undergirded by concerns of reliability, or the same justification of the
right to counsel. Federal appellate courts’ treatment of juvenile
adjudications is especially illustrative of this concept. In Tighe, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the Apprendi majority required all types of
enhancement factors—except for prior convictions—to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury in the same manner as
elements.335 The rationale for the prior conviction exception “was
premised on sentence-enhancing prior convictions being the product
of proceedings that afford crucial procedural protections.”336 Courts
are relieved from treating prior convictions as elements, because in
theory this proceeding was already “subject to the fundamental
triumvirate of procedural protections intended to guarantee the
reliability of criminal convictions.”337
Tighe thus declined to use juvenile adjudications to increase the
defendant’s jail sentence under a federal recidivist statute for the
reason that the juvenile court did not provide adequate procedural
protections.338 Other federal appellate courts have arrived at the
opposite conclusion, but only after engaging in the same reliability
analysis.339 The Eighth Circuit in particular wrote that use of juvenile
adjudications under recidivist statutes turns “on an examination of
whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable
that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”340
The court noted that juveniles enjoy the right to counsel, a safeguard
that sufficiently ensures the reliability requirements of Apprendi.341
Apprendi and its progeny support the idea that prior convictions
should be treated as elements with their attendant constitutional
protections. The Apprendi majority discussed that if the question of
prior convictions under a recidivism statute were at issue, “a logical

335. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001).
336. Id. at 1194.
337. Id. at 1193 (asserting that this triumvirate includes “fair notice, reasonable
doubt, and the right to a jury trial”).
338. Id. at 1194–95.
339. See United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2010) (pointing to
juveniles’ “rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to crossexamination, and the privilege against self-incrimination [in addition to] proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” as sufficient procedural protections in the absence of
the right to a jury trial (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971)
(plurality opinion))); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007)
(finding “no indication” the defendant did not enjoy “appropriate due process in his
juvenile adjudication”); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003)
(same).
340. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002).
341. Id.
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application of our reasoning today should apply.”342 This logical
application means that courts should only rely upon prior convictions
complying with principles of due process. For this reason, prior
juvenile adjudications are sometimes thought of as guaranteeing
sufficient reliability.343 Tribal court convictions, which are also
obtained through procedures different from adult criminal
proceedings in state and federal court, should be considered the
same way. In fact, their special status as independently sovereign
nations further supports application of a reliability analysis to
these convictions.
C. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Further Supports Application of a Reliability
Analysis to the Use of Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Federal Court
Courts employ different language when writing about the
treatment of prior convictions obtained in tribal court. Some refer to
the “use” of convictions to enhance sentences,344 meaning to impose
longer jail terms for indigent Indian defendants. Alternatively, other
courts refer to the “recogni[tion]” of tribal court judgments.345 As
one state court has written, concerns of comity require “giv[ing] full
effect to the valid judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according to
that sovereign’s laws.”346 These courts discourage applying the
standard of the court in which recognition is sought, which was the
Ninth Circuit’s approach.347 Thus, the question of whether to treat
tribal court convictions as predicate offenses for repeat offender
crimes necessarily involves discussions of sovereignty.
In cases like Cavanaugh, courts have upheld the use of uncounseled
tribal court convictions by emphasizing that the Bill of Rights does
not apply to sovereign tribal nations.348 The Tenth Circuit even
likened tribal court convictions to judgments from foreign

342. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000).
343. See supra notes 122, 124 and accompanying text.
344. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 2011) (presenting
the issue of the case as whether the Constitution precludes use of tribal court
convictions under a recidivist statute), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
345. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003) (arguing that use
of tribal convictions as predicate offenses equates to recognition of the validity of
another sovereign’s judgment).
346. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245).
347. Id.
348. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595 (emphasizing that Indian tribes, “as separate,
quasi-sovereign bodies,” are not restricted by the Constitution in the same way
federal and state governments are); see also supra notes 260–271 and accompanying
text (discussing cases in which courts emphasized tribal sovereignty concerns).
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countries.349 By this logic, if the Sixth Amendment and its reliability
concerns are not applicable, then tribal court convictions obtained
without the assistance of counsel cannot violate the Sixth
Amendment. The more that federal and state courts emphasize that
the Constitution does not apply to tribal courts, the more justified
they appear in ignoring concerns about the reliability of convictions
obtained from tribal courts.
Emphasizing the “otherness” of tribal nations actually supports the
opposite conclusion; Indian nations’ sovereignty may lead courts
away from recognizing the validity of convictions obtained in nonAmerican courts. When considering foreign convictions as predicate
offenses under recidivist statutes, state and federal district courts have
used a “fundamental fairness” test.350 Though the standard is
somewhat inexact, courts generally look to the procedures employed
by foreign jurisdictions.351 If these procedures meet “American
standards of fundamental fairness,” the conviction is considered valid
as a predicate offense.352 The Tenth Circuit has even referenced the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations when considering treatment of
prior convictions from tribal courts in particular.353 The Restatement
lists two grounds for refusing to recognize the judgment of a foreign
court, one of which includes a fairness concern that “the judgment
was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.”354
Regardless of the label, all of these tests evaluate the due process
afforded in the earlier proceeding. Perhaps due to inexact standards,

349. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998–99.
350. See United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(invalidating a conviction from Mexico as a predicate offense under a drug
possession statute).
351. See Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Convictions Under
American Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in Determining
Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 514–18 (1997) (analyzing
the procedural unfairness of using foreign convictions obtained in violation of U.S.
constitutional guarantees).
352. See State v. Williams, 663 A.2d 1378, 1387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995)
(referencing the fundamental fairness test in Moskovits when evaluating the fairness
of a prior Canadian conviction (citing Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. at 191–92)).
353. See Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999 (stating that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have used the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations to determine whether to
recognize tribal judgments under principles of comity (citing Burrell v. Armijo, 456
F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th Cir. 2006); MacArther v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216, 1225
(10th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1997))).
354. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(1)(a) (1987). The
second ground for refusing to recognize the judgment of a foreign court is when
“the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the defendant
in accordance with the law of the rendering state and with the rules set forth in
§ 421.” Id. § 482(1)(b).
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this body of law has resulted in different outcomes. Failure to
provide a jury trial has not been found fundamentally unfair, with use
of the foreign conviction permissible in federal court.355 Courts have
decided both ways with regard to uncounseled convictions. A valid
waiver of counsel in the foreign jurisdiction has satisfied due
process concerns.356 On the other hand, a court has invalidated a
foreign conviction where no option of assistance of counsel was
given to the defendant.357
Application of a fundamental fairness or due process test to Indian
nations might mean some tribal court convictions could not be used
in federal court. This approach is complicated in two respects but
shows how treating tribal convictions as foreign judgments once more
raises Sixth Amendment reliability concerns. First, tribal justice
systems vary.358 Tribal courts are only one form of dispute resolution,
operating differently across tribes.359 Some tribes rely on courts
administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior, and others join
resources to create intertribal courts for shared use.360 There are 566
federally recognized tribes in the United States,361 and it is unclear
how many tribal courts exist.362 A 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics
report documented 175 tribes operating courts on their reservations,
forty-six of which have voluntarily established public defender

355. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (“When one is convicted in this country in violation of a federal
constitutional right to a jury trial, vindication of the constitutional right may warrant
exclusion of evidence of the conviction. But there is no such justification for
excluding a conviction obtained without a jury in a foreign country.”).
356. See Williams, 663 A.2d at 1390 (noting that the defendant had been
represented during three-quarters of his trial before voluntarily dismissing counsel).
357. See United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“The
requirement which the Supreme Court of our country has found to be a central
dimension of American criminal procedure is the presence of counsel at all
significant stages of the criminal proceeding.”).
358. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE
AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002 19–20 (2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf (discussing the diversity of tribal justice systems in
Indian Country).
359. See id. at 19 (describing indigenous forums, also known as council of elders or
peacemaking circles, as another type of dispute resolution mechanism).
360. See id. at 20 (describing courts administered by the U.S. Department of
Interior for minor offenses, and inter-tribal court systems where economically and
administratively feasible).
361. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., http://www.bia.gov/FAQs
/index.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013).
362. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian
Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 60, 71 (2013) (estimating
300 tribal courts currently in existence but admitting that nobody knows the
exact number).
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services.363 If the right to counsel is a concern when recognizing
foreign convictions in federal court, judging tribal court convictions
according to the same fairness test would invalidate a significant
number of them.364
The comparison between foreign nations and tribal nations fails in
one significant respect: whereas Indian nations are sovereign, the
federal government retains the power to limit the reach of their
jurisdiction.365 Congress furthermore exercises control over tribal
governments through the ICRA, which obligates tribal courts to
afford certain rights to defendants during criminal proceedings.366
One federal appellate court has held that as long as a tribal court
conviction does not violate the ICRA, it automatically complies with
due process protections.367 Another scholar has argued that because
of the ICRA, due process protections are “virtually identical” in tribal
and state courts.368 From this perspective, treating tribal court
convictions different from state court convictions—like foreign
convictions, for example—is tantamount to treating them as less
trustworthy than state court convictions.369
Other scholars compare not only procedure, but also values, when
examining just what guarantees fundamental fairness in tribal
courts.370 According to this view, equating tribal court convictions
with state court convictions for the purpose of incorporating them
into a Western sentencing scheme does not honor tribal
sovereignty.371 Because the tribal court has already adjudicated the
363. See PERRY, supra note 358, at 20, 37–42 (listing the number of tribes providing
public defender services in each state).
364. See, e.g., United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(refusing to recognize a Mexican conviction obtained without counsel for sentencing
enhancement purposes).
365. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (declaring that Congress
controls the “metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty”).
366. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (obligating tribal nations to provide U.S.
constitutional protections such as, inter alia, prohibiting a defendant from being
compelled to be a witness in his or her own trial); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts
and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 424–25 (2004) (listing constitutional
protections incorporated into the Indian Civil Rights Act from the Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments).
367. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We
hold that tribal convictions obtained in compliance with ICRA are necessarily
compatible with due process of law.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
368. See Washburn, supra note 366, at 426 (insisting that some tribal courts are
“replicas” of state courts).
369. See id. at 428 (asserting that tribal courts are arguably more trustworthy than,
for example, South Dakota state trial courts).
370. See id. at 421 (analogizing concerns about the diversity of processes and
values in foreign courts to tribal courts).
371. See Creel, supra note 187, at 84 (contending that treatment of tribal court
convictions like state court convictions is “based on western notions of justice”).

TRAYER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

ELEMENTARY UNFAIRNESS

11/2/2013 12:41 PM

261

dispute according to its own customs and laws, using such convictions
to enhance federal sentences only promotes federal power.372 This
tension created by federal law superseding tribal authority can also be
seen by some tribes rejecting exclusively Western notions of
fundamental fairness.373 Shortly after passage of the ICRA, several
tribes incorporated relevant American case law in their opinions on
claims under the new legislation.374 Gradually, tribes like the Navajo
Nation have moved away from the ICRA as a source of fundamental
fairness in Indian law, instead finding due process foundations in
their traditional customs and values.375 According to this trend, tribal
court compliance with the ICRA only highlights the quasi-sovereign status
of Indian nations, not their inherent sovereignty as nations with their own
values predating “American standards of fundamental fairness.”376
Emphasizing the sovereign status of tribal nations does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that tribal court convictions should
serve as predicate offenses for federal recidivist crimes. If tribal
nations are viewed as sovereign and the Bill of Rights inapplicable to
their court proceedings, then tribal court judgments are more akin to
judgments of foreign courts. Therefore, a fairness or due process test
is more appropriate when considering how to treat such convictions.
It remains unclear whether tribal court convictions, with their own
procedures and values, might withstand this test. Nevertheless, both
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and that on the recognition of
foreign judgments support application of a reliability analysis.
D. The Tribal Law and Order Act’s Partial Sixth Amendment Right Does
Not Fill the Gap in Indigent Indian Defendants’ Right to Counsel
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that Cavanaugh’s prior tribal
court convictions occurred before passage of the Tribal Law and
Order Act, which now provides for a partial Sixth Amendment right

372. See id. at 85 (characterizing the relationship between the federal government
and tribal nations as a “history of denigration of tribal sentencing authority”).
373. See id. (tracing disregard for tribal sentencing authority back to Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which the author describes as an early example of
Supreme Court disrespect for tribal court punishments consistent with tribal values).
374. See Fletcher, supra note 362, at 77–79 (providing excerpts from tribal court
opinions that have incorporated federal law to interpret the ICRA).
375. See id. at 86–87 (deeming the ICRA “all but irrelevant” in Navajo case law
because it merely acted as a “steppingstone” to developing independent notions of
fundamental fairness). See generally Paul Spruhan, The Meaning of Due Process in the
Navajo Nation, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 119 (Kristen A. Carpenter et
al. eds., 2012) (claiming that the Navajo Nation has “transcend[ed] federal
definitions of due process”).
376. State v. Williams, 663 A.2d 1378, 1387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).
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to counsel.377 While this legislation obligates tribal governments to
appoint defense counsel at their own expense in certain situations,
the challenge of how to treat uncounseled convictions from tribal
courts in federal proceedings cannot simply be legislated away. A
close reading of the law shows several obstacles that will prevent
TLOA from truly closing the gap in indigent Indian defendants’ right
to counsel.
TLOA’s new sentencing authority allows tribal courts to impose
punishments of up to three years of imprisonment and a concurrent
maximum fine of $15,000.378 These sentences are authorized in two
situations. First, when a defendant commits an offense comparable
to a felony under federal or state law.379 The increased punishment
is also permitted for defendants who have been “previously
convicted of the same or a comparable offense by any jurisdiction
in the United States.”380 Thus, if an Indian defendant is facing
prosecution in tribal court as a repeat offender, he can now face
up to a three-year jail term.
In order to take advantage of this increased sentencing authority,
TLOA mandates that tribes provide five “rights of defendants.”381
Two of these rights relate to the provision of defense counsel. First,
the law requires “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”382 The
meaning of this provision remains unclear, but the statute could refer
to a standard of reasonably effective assistance as described in
Strickland v. Washington.383 Further ambiguities also arise in language
that ensures assistance of counsel for indigent defendants:
[T]he Indian tribe shall . . . at the expense of the tribal
government, provide an indigent defendant the assistance of a
defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the
United States that applies appropriate professional licensing
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional
responsibility of its licensed attorneys.384
377. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting
the requirement under TLOA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2012), to appoint counsel
when a tribal court imposes a sentence longer than one year), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1542 (2012).
378. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
379. Id. § 1302(b)(2).
380. Id. § 1302(b)(1).
381. Id. § 1302(c)(1)–(5).
382. Id. § 1302(c)(1).
383. See 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail, a challenge to the effectiveness of
counsel “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
384. TLOA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2).
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The statute specifically refers to assistance of counsel by an
attorney.385 Still, it is unclear what kind of licensing standards might
be considered sufficient under this provision. A defense attorney
might belong only to a tribal bar, which a federal court could
consider an inadequate professional licensing standard.386
Three other conditions also accompany TLOA’s increased
sentencing authority. In addition to providing defense counsel for
indigent defendants, tribes must observe certain professional
requirements for judges.387 The presiding judge must be licensed to
practice law and have “sufficient legal training to preside over
criminal proceedings.”388 Lastly, tribes must make their criminal laws
and rules of evidence and procedure “publicly available,”389 as well as
“maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or
other recording of the trial proceeding.”390 Not only does requiring
the availability of defense counsel potentially impose a financial
burden on tribes, but concerns have also been raised about requiring
that judges be lawyers.391 In the Navajo Nation, for example, only two
out of twenty judges possess a law degree and are admitted to the
state bar.392
These ambiguities are significant for future prosecution of
recidivist crimes like § 117. A defendant could be convicted of a
felony in tribal court, in which case TLOA requires the provision of
defense counsel at the expense of the tribal government.393 In this
situation, TLOA would have achieved what the ICRA never did.
However, the inexact language in the statute also opens such
convictions to multiple statutory challenges. In fact, tribes have been
cautioned to carefully proceed in implementation of TLOA’s
sentencing authority for this reason. One expert warned that a large
number of verdicts may be thrown out if judges or defense counsel
seem to have deficient credentials or experience, “essentially ending
385. Id.
386. See Patton, supra note 185, at 786 (speculating that TLOA provides “little
guidance” in regard to the licensing standards referenced in the law).
387. TLOA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3).
388. Id. § 1302(c)(3)(A).
389. Id. § 1302(c)(4); see also Patton, supra note 185, at 789 (warning that adoption
of formal rules of procedure and evidence may force members to rely on lawyers with
specialized skills in order to navigate the legal system).
390. Id. § 1302(c)(5).
391. See Patton, supra note 185, at 788 (highlighting the probability of recusal in
small tribal communities, which would further decrease the pool of available legaltrained judges).
392. Id. at 787 (clarifying that these two judges are the chief justice and one
district court judge).
393. TLOA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2).
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the new law.”394 In this way, TLOA may have created its own barriers to
achieving criminal convictions with the assistance of defense counsel.
In the alternative, TLOA may have no effect on how uncounseled
convictions from tribal courts are treated in subsequent federal
proceedings. A defendant can still be prosecuted for a misdemeanor
in tribal court without the right to defense counsel.395 Post-TLOA,
defendants like Cavanaugh may still have their uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions serve as the basis for new charges in federal
court.396
Furthermore, approximately one-third of federally
recognized tribes do not plan to take advantage of TLOA’s increased
sentencing authority.397 These tribes simply do not have enough
money to meet TLOA’s preconditions for implementing the new
sentencing guidelines.398 TLOA’s partial right to counsel thus has
limited effect if misdemeanor convictions are pursued in place of
felony convictions.
Rather than solving the challenges posed by uncounseled tribal
court convictions in Cavanaugh, TLOA may have done the opposite.
The statute actually sanctions use of an uncounseled tribal court
conviction to increase punishment in a subsequent criminal
proceeding in tribal court.399 Using TLOA as a vehicle, Congress has
extended to tribal courts the challenges of prosecuting recidivist
crimes where defendants are not represented by defense counsel in
earlier proceedings. Put another way, the same legislation that
imposes the right to counsel on tribal governments under some
circumstances also ignores concerns about the reliability of prior
convictions in other cases. Regardless of subjective views on
whether tribal justice systems should or do mimic state or federal
courts, TLOA shows that congressional manipulation of Indian
jurisdiction and individual rights does not necessarily ensure
fairness in criminal proceedings.
394. Carol Berry, Federal Laws Discriminate; Tribal Justice May Improve, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 18, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/article/federal-laws-discriminate%3B-tribal-justice-may-improve-18198.
395. See TLOA, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (providing protections only for offenses
carrying a potential sentence of one year or greater).
396. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding
that uncounseled tribal court convictions may be used to prove the elements of a
repeat offender, domestic violence statute), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
397. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 237, at 3 (surveying tribes
on whether they plan to exercise TLOA’s sentencing authority).
398. See id. at 7–8 (reporting that 96% of tribes most frequently cited lack of funding
as the main obstacle to implementing TLOA’s increased sentencing authority).
399. See TLOA, § 1302(b)(1) (extending increased sentencing authority to tribal
court prosecutions of defendants who “ha[ve] been previously convicted of the same
or a comparable offense by any jurisdiction in the United States”).
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CONCLUSION
Gideon’s Trumpet, written by a Supreme Court correspondent for
the New York Times, served as the basis for a 1980 movie of the same
name, starring Henry Fonda as Clarence Gideon and Lane Smith as
his defense attorney.400 On the 30th anniversary of the Gideon
decision, author Anthony Lewis recounted watching the movie being
made.401 He remembered the filming of Gideon’s first trial, where he
did not have a defense attorney:
The prosecutor asked the taxi driver, “Did Mr. Gideon say anything
when he got in the cab?” The taxi driver said: “Yes, he said, ‘Don’t
tell anybody you picked me up.’” The prosecutor said, “Thank you
very much. That’s all.” And the judge said, “Mr. Gideon, would you
care to cross-examine”? Well, as you know, he had no questions.402

The film juxtaposed this first trial with Gideon’s second trial, where
an attorney represented him. During the filming of the second trial,
Lewis watched as the taxi driver once again took the stand and
repeated the same story:
[The defense attorney] said, “Had he ever said that to you before?”
And the taxi driver said: “Oh, yes. He said that to me every time I
picked him up.” “Why?” The taxi driver said: “I think it was some
kind of woman trouble.” And Lane Smith, making this part up,
walked over to the jury with a broad wink and said, “Well, we all
know about that.” And the director said, “Cut.” And I turned to
the person next to me and I said, “My God, it really makes a
difference to have a lawyer, doesn’t it?”403

Since the Supreme Court first considered the issue, it has found
that counsel plays a crucial role in all phases of criminal proceedings,
for all types of offenses. Yet, indigent American Indians sometimes
face longer prison sentences in criminal proceedings in federal court
based on prior convictions where they did not enjoy the right to
counsel. They are the only class of U.S. citizens faced with this
dilemma under statutes that punish repeat offenders with increased
penalties. This inequity was originally created by an incomplete
extension of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments, which still
persists today. At its core, though, the problem of different treatment
for American Indians in federal court is a misunderstanding of
400. GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions 1980); see also
Gideon Conference, supra note 49, at 17 (remarking that at the time he wrote Gideon’s
Trumpet, Anthony Lewis, the author, was “naïve about the promise of equal justice”
and assumed that “political system would vindicate the rights established in Gideon”).
401. Gideon Conference, supra note 49, at 17 (remarks of Anthony Lewis).
402. Id. at 17.
403. Id.
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criminal law. The existing uncertainty regarding what constitutes a
sentencing factor as opposed to an element of a crime has created
different standards of constitutional protections depending on which
label is chosen. If a conviction is a sentencing factor, it does not
require assistance of counsel. If the conviction is an element,
assistance is mandated.
In order to avoid these semantics, federal courts should focus on
the Supreme Court’s original intent underlying the right to counsel.
When considering prior convictions in prosecution of repeat
offender crimes, courts should look to whether the convictions are
sufficiently reliable. The basis for this approach can be found in
Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny, particularly in the way courts
have treated juvenile adjudications. A reliability analysis is further
supported by Indian nations’ inherent sovereignty. As federal courts
insist that judgments from tribal courts are the equivalent to those
from sovereign nations, this approach provides the strongest basis for
invalidating them. Emphasizing Indian tribes as foreign would
actually support non-recognition of their judgments out of concern
for un-American standards of due process. Ironically, this approach
means that viewing tribal courts as foreign jurisdictions is more
effective than legislation like the Tribal Law and Order Act in
creating parity between the rights of Indians and non-Indians.
Domestic violence by repeat offenders remains a problem of
enormous proportions across Indian country. As one victims’ rights
advocate pointed out, “We have serial rapists on the reservation . . .
because they know they can get away with it.”404 The aim of this
Comment has not been to minimize the important potential of
repeat offender laws to combat this epidemic of violence. Rather, it
has sought to explore a unique constitutional challenge presented by
years of federal control over tribal nations’ criminal jurisdiction. For
the same reasons that Anthony Lewis observed twenty years ago, it
holds true on Gideon’s fiftieth anniversary that a lawyer’s assistance is
still an essential part of the criminal justice system for all U.S. citizens.
For some indigent Indian defendants, it remains to be seen whether
the gap in federal laws that denies them the right to counsel is
narrowing, or if another fifty years is needed.

404. Egan, supra note 203 (quoting Charon Asetoyer, Native rights health
advocate).

